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COMMENTS
WOR.KMEN'S COMPENSATION: MEANING OF THE
PHRASE "ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT"
AS USED IN THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
By ALBERT BIANCmI

Workmen's Compensation has been concisely defined as a mechanism
for providing cash benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected
injuries regardless of fault, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the consumer, through the medium of insurance, the premiums
of which are passed on in the cost of the product.' In all but a few states
the basic formula for compensation requires a personal injury to, or death
of, an employee by accident "arising out of and in the course of employment." In California, for instance, the Labor Code, section 3600, reads in
part as follows:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division ... shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained
by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and
for the death of any2 employee if the injury proximately causes death ....
(Emphasis added. )

As the statute makes clear, Workmen's Compensation is not intended to
amount to an insuring by the employer of his employees at all times and
under all circumstances during the period of employment, but only where
certain conditions are met, including one that the injury be of a type "arising out of" the employment.3 However, the California statute does not
define this phrase--the meaning intended by the Legislature has been left
for determination by the courts.' It is the purpose of this article to review
some of the judicial interpretations of the words "arising out of ... the

employment"' as used in the California Labor Code, and to attempt to
define the view which prevails in California at the present time.
Several different theories have been utilized by the courts in awarding
or denying Workmen's Compensation. One of these has been designated
the "peculiar risk doctrine." 6 Under this view, an injury arises out of employment only when it results from a hazard peculiar to or increased by
that employment, and not common to the public generally.
1

LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§1.00 (1952).

2 CArxF.LAB. CODE § 3600.
3 CAnx. LAB. CODE § 3600; Larson v. Indus . Acc. Com., 193 Cal. 406, 224 P. 744 (1924);
Storm v. Indus. Acc. Com, 191 Cal. 4, 214 P. 874 (1923) ; Casualty Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com.,
176 Cal. 530, 169 P. 76 (1917) ; Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319, 153 P. 24
(1915).
427 CAL. Jun. § 6; Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Indus. Acc. Com., 186 Cal.
653, 200 P. 419 (1921).
5
6

CALIF. LAB. CODE § 3600.
L.oN,
WORKmN's COMPENSATION

§ 6.00 et seq.
[49]
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A second theory is called the "actual risk doctrine."' It is based on the
proposition that whether the risk was also common to the general public
is immaterial, so long as it was in fact a risk of the particular employment.
The third and by far the most liberal view is the "positional risk doctrine."" Under this theory, the injury is said to arise out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and
obligations of the employment placed the workman in the position where
he was injured. Under this theory, compensation may be awarded in situations where the only connection between the employment and the injury
is the fact that the employment placed the workman in the particular place
at a particular time when he was injured. Hence compensation may be
made available whenever the employment brings the workman to the position where he is injured.
We will now examine each of these doctrines as they have been applied,
albeit sometimes in a modified form, by the California courts.'
I. The PeculiarRisk Doctrine
In Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury," decided in 1916, an employee
who was known by his associates to be particularly susceptible to tickling,
was tickled by a coemployee while descending stairs at the place of employment. He fell and was injured. The California Supreme Court classified the injury as one resulting from "horseplay," and held that it did not
arise out of the employment. The court set out the following rule:
"The accidents arising out of the employment of the person injured are
those in which it is possible to trace the injury to the nature of the em-

ployee's work or to the risks to which the employer's business exposes the
employee. The accident must be one resulting from a risk reasonably incident to the employment. (Citation.) It 'arises out of' the occupation when
there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the servant
works and the resulting injury. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected

with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational
consequence.""
The court's attitude was that the risk in this case was not peculiar to the
employment, hence the injury did not arise out of the employment and was
not compensable.
In the same year, the court considered another case, Kimbol v. Indus.
Acc. Com.,'2 in which an employer had leased the lower floor of a building,
7

lbid.
8 Ibid.
9 A fourth view, "the proximate cause" doctrine, will not be discussed here. It depended
largely on tort principles, and required that the harm have been foreseeable as a hazard of the
type of employment involved if it was to be compensable. See LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSAflON § 6.00 et seq.
10 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212 (1916).
11 Id. at 685, 158 P. at 213.
12 173 Cal. 351, 160 P. 150 (1916).
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using it for a restaurant. The floor above, which was rented by a stranger,
gave way, thereby causing an employee below to be injured by a falling
object. Applying the peculiar risk doctrine here, the court found that compensation should be awarded:
"The danger was one peculiar to that very place... and it is not unreasonable to say that Douglas was specially exposed to that danger by
reason of his employment." 13
In State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Acc. Com.,' 4 decided in 1924, a
hotel maid was injured by falling while leaving the servants' entrance to
the hotel on her "day off." The California Supreme Court held that she
was entitled to compensation under the peculiar risk doctrine:
"Where the employment itself involves peculiar and abnormal exposure to
a common peril, which peculiar exposure is annexed as a risk incidental
to the employment, it has been repeatedly held that the risk is incidental
to the employment within the meaning of compensation statutes."' 5
And later in this same opinion the court went a step further than was usual
under the peculiar risk theory, saying:
"The fact that the accident happens upon a public road or at a railroad
crossing, and that the danger is one to which the generalpublic is likewise
exposed, is not conclusive against the existence of such causal relationship
if the danger be one to which the employee, by reason of and in connection
with his employment, is subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal degree."
(Emphasis added.)' 6
By saying that the injury was compensable even though the general public
was exposed to the same risk, the court seems to have liberalized the rule
previously applied in such cases. Thus the stage was set for the California
courts to move on to our second theory, the actual risk doctrine.

II. The Actual Risk Doctrinme
In 1927 the California courts had occasion to decide the case of Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com.,' 7 where a milk truck driver was injured by the glass from milk bottles which were caused to fall and break
as a result of an earthquake. It might be possible to argue that because the
driver's employment involved the handling of glass objects, susceptible as
they are to breakage, that the driver was in fact "peculiarly exposed" to
risk of injury by reason of his employment. On the other hand, the earthquake which caused the bottles to break was certainly not a risk peculiar
to the employment; it seems fair to say that any member of the public
would share equally in the chance of injury from an earthquake. In any
IS Id. at 354, 160 P. at 151.
14194 Cal. 28, 227 P. 168 (1924).
15 Id. at 31, 227 P. at 168.

16Id. at 31, 227 P. at 169.
17202 Cal. 247, 259 P. 1099 (1927).
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event, the court permitted the milk truck driver to recover compensation.
Such a result would follow logically if the doctrine of actual risk were
applied, but would have been much more unlikely under a strict application of the older peculiar risk doctrine.
And in 1936, in Calif. Cas. Ins. Exch. v. Indus. Acc. Com., 8 the court
ordered compensation for the widow and child of a salesman who was required to travel on his employer's business, and while on such a trip spent
the night in an auto camp, where he was asphyxiated by carbon monoxide
gas from a heater. Quite probably any member of the general public who
stayed at the particular place at the time under discussion would have been
likewise asphyxiated. Hence the risk was not peculiar to the employment.
But regardless of whether the risk was common to the general public, it
was in fact an actual risk of the particular employment, and recovery was
therefore permitted.
A somewhat analogous case, Pac. Emnp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com., 19
arose in 1942. There a traveling salesman contracted San Joaquin Valley
fever while in the valley on business for his employer, it appearing that the
employer's business was his sole reason for being there, and medical testimony being to the effect that the disease was of a type characteristically
found in the valley and that in the doctor's opinion the disease was contracted there. Compensation was awarded, and the court stated flatly:
"The injuries suffered to be compensable need not be ...peculiar to the
'20
employment.

With the peculiar risk doctrine so definitely dead and buried, the California courts in 1945 were ready to set out the actual risk rule in a purer
form, and this was accomplished in the case of Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v.
Indus. Acc. Com.2 ' In that case an employee, a bus girl in a hotel, was
struck in the eye by a hard roll thrown by another employee who acted
without animosity and in fact was trying to hit a third employee. The court
directed that compensation be awarded, and expressly overruled Coronado
Beach Co. v. Pillsbury,' a "horseplay" case discussed earlier in this article.
The Coronado case, applying the peculiar risk doctrine, had denied compensation for injuries resulting from horseplay of a fellow employee. In
overruling Coronado, the court said:
"The essential prerequisite to compensation is that danger from which the
injury results be one to which he is exposed as an employee in his particular
employment." 2 3

California was now ready to embrace an even more liberal view-the positional risk doctrine.
185 Cal.2d 185, 53 P.2d 758 (1936).

19 Cal.2d 622, 122 P.2d 570 (1942).
Id. at 629, 122 P.2d at 573.
2126 Cal.2d 286, 158 P.2d 9 (1945).
22 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212 (1916).
23 See note 21 supra at 289, 158 P.2d at 11.
19

20
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The Positional Risk Doctrine

In the case of Indus. Inden. Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com.,A decided by the
California District Court of Appeal in 1950, the court apparently adopted
the positional risk theory. The facts showed that an employee of an inn
was killed by a shot intended for a customer during an altercation in which
the employee took no part. The employee's minor child was awarded workmen's compensation, the court saying:
"[W] hen a person's employment brings him to a position which becomes
dangerous and he is there acting in the scope of his employment, his injury
is compensable." 25
Under this view, then, there is no need to show, in order to gain compensation, that the injury resulted from a risk peculiar to the employer's business, nor that there was an actual risk of injury to the employee who was
acting in pursuance of his employment-the injury will be held to have
arisen out of the employment whenever it can be shown that the employment required the employee to be in what turned out to be a place of
danger.
In 1952 the California Supreme Court indicated its approval of this
position in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Acc. Com., a case wherein an
employee in a road construction crew was the aggressor in a fight with his
foreman, and was injured in the scuffle. Compensation was awarded. The
court said:
"It is sufficient that the work brings the claimant within the range of peril
by requiring his presence there when it strikes."2 7
Notice that in this case the workman himself, by being the aggressor, probably caused the peril to strike; nonetheless, it was by reason of his employment that he was within its range, and hence the injury was said to arise
out of the employment.
Two recent cases, Madin v. Indus. Acc. CornY s and Wiseman v. Indus.
Acc. Com.,28 both decided in 1956, indicate that California will continue to
look upon the question of whether an injury arises out of employment with
a liberal and, in the opinion of this writer, a commendably humane attitude. In the Madin case, an employee lived in one of his employer's rental
units under an agreement to act as caretaker and manager of the property.
He was injured when a bulldozer, which was being used on other property
not belonging to the employer, ran wild after being started without authority by some boys, and rammed into a unit occupied by the employee, push24 95

Cal. App.2d 804, 214 P.2d 41 (1950).

25Id. at 813, 214 P.2d at 47.

2838 Cal.2d 659, 242 P.2d 311 (1952).
2
7 !d.at 666, 242 P.2d at 315.
28 46 Cal.2d 90, 292 P.2d 892 (1956).
20 46 A.C. 576, 297 P.2d 649 (1956).
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ing him while in bed through the walls of the unit. In holding that compensation should be awarded, the court stated:
"Where the injury occurs on the employer's premises, while the employee
is in the course of the employment, the injury arises out of the employment
unless the connection
is so remote from the employment that it is not an
30 °
incident of it.

To see just how far an employee may go and still not be injured by a
force which is "so remote from the employment that it is not an incident
of it," we need but examine the Wiseman case. There the employee was on
a business trip, and while staying in a hotel with a woman not his wife, died
from asphyxiation and burns from a fire probably caused by the careless
smoking of the employee or the woman. Compensation was awarded to the
employee's widow and daughter. Said the court:
"The fact that the employee had a guest in his room while he was off duty
in no way detracted from the fact that he was also there on his employer's
business, and since the employee's fault is irrelevant if the requirements of
the law are met, it is immaterial that the employee's personal purpose in
having a guest in his room was immoral and unlawful." 3' 1
It might be well to conclude by making one further observation. As was
stated previously in this article, the California Labor Code, section 3600,
requires that if an injury is to be compensable it must both arise out of and
occur in the course of employment. 2 We have seen that the California law
has passed through a remarkably active evolutionary process in reaching
its present concept of the phrase "arising out of employment" as used in
the Workmen's Compensation statute. We will not here attempt to review
the history of the additional phrase requiring that the injury also occur
"in the course of employment." But we may say that insofar as "in the
course of employment" is concerned, it seems from the cases that ordinarily the purpose of the conduct of the employee out of which the injury
arose, rather than the method of its performance, determines whether he
was injured in the course of his employment, unless the conduct, even
though intended to forward the purpose of the employer, was of such an
extraordinary nature that it could not reasonably be said to be within the
scope of the employment.3 3 And it would appear that under the present
California view as expressed in the Madin 4 case and reiterated in the
Wiseman 5 case, the phrase "in the course of employment" includes everything which is meant by "arising out of employment." A finding that the
injury occurred in the course of employment will ordinarily also involve a
30 See note 28 supra at 93, 292 P.2d at 895.
31
See note 29 supra at 579, 297 P.2d at 651.
3
2 CA=. LAB. CODE § 3600.
33 Standard Lumber Co. v. Indus. Acc. Com., 60 CalApp. 331, 212 P. 720 (1922) ; 27 CAL.
JUR. § 60.

*4 See note 28 supra.
35 See note 29 supra.
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conclusion that the injury was one arising out of the employment, "unless
the connection is so remote from the employment that it is not an incident
of it."" Thus while the two phrases originally had separate and distinct
meanings, a "moving together" has taken place, and the two now appear
to be virtually synonomous.

38 See note 30 supra.

